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CHAPTER 18 
Insurance 
J. ALBERT BURGOYNE and GEORGE E. DONOVAN 
A. GENERAL INSURANCE - COURT DECISIONS 
§18.1. Agents and brokers: Liability. Rozen v. Cohen1 was an 
action in tort and contract against an insurance broker by the insured 
who was named in 18 standard fire insurance policies covering two 
properties located in an area of the city of Boston characterized by a 
large number of marginal properties. In the contract count the plain-
tiff complained that his broker had procured the cancellation of his 
fire insurance policies and put him in a position in which he was 
obliged to obtain new policies, which he was able to do only at greatly 
increased cost. The canceled policies were five-year renewals of five-
year policies previously obtained for the plaintiff by the broker. 
Throughout the period of his contract with the broker, the plaintiff 
had been irregular and dilatory in making payment of premiums. 
The broker had repeatedly accepted late and overdue premium pay-
ments. A personal visit by the broker to the plaintiff seeking payment 
of a long overdue premium balance on the renewal policies resulted 
in a heated dispute and an order from the plaintiff that the broker 
leave the premises. Two days later the broker wrote to the general 
agents requesting cancellation of the policies for non-payment of 
premiums. On this same day he wrote the plaintiff giving him notice 
that he had marked his records not to renew any policy for the 
plaintiff and that the policies with an unpaid premium balance were 
in the process of cancellation. 
An insurance broker in procuring insurance is for limited purposes 
the agent of the insured,2 but is by statuteS held to be the agent of the 
insurance company for the purpose of receiving any premium on a 
policy negotiated, continued or renewed for a person other than him-
self. Within the terms of the brokerage arrangement, the broker owes 
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noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.6. 
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a duty of fidelity to his principals, but this does not mean that he is 
precluded from protecting his own proper interests. The broker was 
under a contractual obligation to use reasonable efforts to procure 
satisfactory insurance while the brokerage relationship continued,4 
but he was entitled to be indemnified for any premiums which he had 
advanced or for which he was liable to the insurers or their agents. 
In the view of the Supreme Judicial Court, a jury could not reason-
ably conclude that any agency or fiduciary relationship continued after 
the dispute between the parties concerning overdue payments and the 
broker's letter written shortly thereafter to the insured. While it might 
be argued that the broker's long-continued forebearance in respect of 
overdue premiums might have estopped him from procuring cancella-
tion of the policies without reasonable notice of a discontinuance of 
his liberal collection attitude, it cannot be successfully argued that 
the insured did not have adequate notice that continued failure to pay 
overdue premiums involved a serious risk to him. The broker could 
justifiably regard the insured's conduct as a material breach of their 
agency arrangement and proceed to affect its termination. 
§I8.2. Insurance agents: Agency contract. The plaintiff in Shu-
man v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance CO.1 sought an accounting of 
commissions alleged to be due for the sale of accident and health 
insurance policies written by the plaintiff as agent for the defendant 
insurer. The agent's contract provided for the payment on policies 
written by the agent of a renewal collection fee during the life of his 
contract and while he continued as an active agent selling exclusively 
for Mutual of Omaha and producing a specified minimum number of 
policies per month. It further provided that the minimum production 
requirement would be waived when the agent attained the age of 65 
years. In the event of permanent and total disability of the agent after 
meeting the production requirements for one year, he was entitled to 
receive the renewal collection fees until his death. If the contract re-
mained in effect at the agent's death, the fees would be payable for 
life to a designated beneficiary. Under its terms, the contract could be 
canceled by either party at any time by written notice to the other 
party. Additionally, if the agent, without the written permission of 
Mutual of Omaha, wrote or attempted to write insurance for any other 
company "this contract shall become null and void and all rights 
provided for in this contract shall cease."2 
The agent reached age 65 in December, 1954, but continued to write 
insurance for Mutual of Omaha until December, 1958, at which time 
Mutual of Omaha terminated his appointment as agent and gave him 
written notice of termination of his agency contract. The agent re-
4 Rayden Engineering Corp. v. Church, 337 Mass. 652, 151 N.E.2d 57 (1958), 
noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§3.3, 18.1. 
§18.2. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 239, 214 N.E.2d 76. 
2Id. at 240, 214 N.E.2d at 77. 
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ceived and cashed a check from Mutual of Omaha and, by endorse-
ment under seal, acknowledged that it was "payment in full for services 
rendered and/or any indebtedness to payee by payor." Shortly there-
after, he became the licensed agent of two different insurance com-
panies during a period of two and one-half years. Whether he actually 
sold any insurance is not in evidence. The agent contended that he 
was, nevertheless, entitled to renewal collection fees from Mutual of 
Omaha since the waiver of the production requirement at age 65 left 
him free of any specified duties and that he had accrued rights under 
the contract which were not dependent upon continuing perform-
ance.3 He further contended that if the company's obligation to pay 
the fees depended only upon the continuation of the contract, then it 
would in effect have the option to terminate its obligations, both as 
to the agent and his widow, for no other reason than to escape such 
obligations. 
The Court rejected this construction of the contract, which would 
free the agent of all contract obligations but preserve the company's 
obligation to pay renewal commissions. On the contrary, it would ap-
pear that the best that can be said for the plaintiff is that he was a 
retired agent without authority to write new insurance, with a right 
to renewal commissions, but subject to an obligation not to write 
insurance for others. The company's tender of final payment may be 
construed as a repudiation of the right to continued commissions but 
the Court found that the agent had unequivocally acquiesced in that 
repudiation, thus cutting off any rights he might have had prior to 
his licensing as an agent for a new company. 
§18.3. Motor vehicle insurance: Uninsured motorists coverage. 
The plaintiff in Whitney v. American Fidelity Companyl sought to 
recover, under the "protection against uninsured motorists" coverage2 
of a Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Liability Policy issued by the de-
fendant insurer, for bodily injury sustained while a guest in an auto-
mobile owned and operated by one Clegg. The policy sued upon was 
issued to the plaintiff's father, but the plaintiff was by definition an 
insured person under the uninsured motorists coverage. Clegg'S policy 
covering the automobile involved in the accident, also a Massachusetts 
Motor Vehicle Liability Policy, afforded only compulsory liability 
insurance3 and did not afford the optional guest coverage, thus raising 
the question as to whether Clegg's automobile was an uninsured 
3 Clobe Paper Co. v. Russell Box Co., 291 Mass. 1, 195 N.E. 710 (1935). 
§18.3. l1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 579, 215 N.E.2d 767. 
2 Uninsured motorists coverage was authorized in Massachusetts by Acts of 
1959, c. 438, enacting §lllD of C.L., c. 175, and is made a mandatory part of all 
Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Policies, unless rejected by the named in-
sured, by Acts of 1966, c. 260. See §18.12 infra. 
3 C.L., c. 90, §34A, prescribes the coverage required as a condition of motor 
vehicle registration. No provision is made within the compulsory coverage for in-
juries to guests in the insured motor vehicle. 
3
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automobile.4 The Supreme Judicial Court construed the words "policy 
applicable at the time of the accident" to mean a policy "capable of 
being applied" to this plaintiff's injuries. At the very least, said the 
Court, there was an ambiguity in the language of the policy and fol-
lowing the long established rule the ambiguity must be resolved 
against the insurance company. The decision seems right and con-
strued the coverage in accord with the intent of the underwriters. 
§18.4. Fire insurance: Increase of risk. In Charles Dowd Box Co. 
v. Fireman's Fund Insurance CO.l the plaintiffs sought to recover un-
der multiple fire insurance policies issued by Fireman's Fund and a 
number of other insurance companies for damages resulting from fire 
on the plaintiffs' premises. The fire started in a new addition to an 
existing building and occurred at a time when the new addition was 
very nearly completed but prior to the installation therein of a planned 
sprinkler system. The fire was discovered by an employee of the build-
ing contractor while he was carrying out some incidental welding 
necessary to complete the roof structure. At the time of the fire and 
during construction the plaintiff stored in the new addition a large 
quantity of paper rolls, which theretofore had been stored in the open 
in the same area. 
All of the fire policies contained the usual provision denying cover-
age for loss occurring while the hazard is increased by any means 
within the control or knowledge of the insured. The policies further 
provided, since they were written at protected rates, that no un-
sprinklered additions or extensions would be made to the insured 
buildings unless immediate notification was given to the New England 
Fire Insurance Rating Association. To each of the policies was at-
tached Alterations and Repairs Clauses granting permission to make 
additions, alterations, or repairs to the insured buildings and extend-
ing coverage to such additions, alterations, and repairs and, to the 
extent the policy covers contents, to contents in such additions, but 
without waiving any of the conditions of the Automatic Sprinkler 
Clause. 
The defendant insurer's exceptions to the denial of their motion for 
directed verdicts and to the denial of their motion for a new trial on 
the grounds that the evidence showed (1) an increase of risk, and (2) 
a breach of the sprinkler clause were overruled by the Court. In its 
lengthy opinion, most of which was devoted to questions concerning 
the assessment of damages, the Court asserted that the presence of 
paper rolls in the uncompleted addition to the plaintiff's building 
did not increase the hazard since they had been stored there prior 
4 The policy defines an uninsured automobile as "an automobile with respect to 
the ownership, maintenance and use of which there is no bodily injury liability 
bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident with respect to 
any person or organization legally responsible for the use of such automobile ..•. " 
1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 579-580, 215 N.E.2d 767, 768. 
§18A. 1 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 975, 218 N.E.2d 64. 
4
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to construction. Moreover, while the use of welding equipment during 
construction did increase the risk of fire, the jury could have found 
that such use was casual or temporary and, hence, not of such a char-
acter as would void the policy. 
The policy gave permission to make additions, alterations, or repairs 
to the insured buildings. The policy also gave permission for such use 
of the insured premises as is incidental to the occupancy described in 
the policy. The Court read these two provisions together so as to allow 
the insured to continue doing business during construction, and thus 
to allow the insured to use the new and uncompleted addition to the 
insured building as a storehouse for paper rolls. To the insurer's con-
tention that the insured breached the contract provision prohibiting 
unsprinklered additions to the insured building "not in failing to in-
stall the sprinkler system but in using the addition prior to the in-
stallation of the sprinklers," the Court stated that no mention was 
made in the policy as to whether the addition might be used during 
construction prior to the installation of a sprinkler system. This, in its 
opinion, created an ambiguity which must be construed against the 
insurer. In any event, the sprinkler clause must be read as allowing a 
reasonable time in which to install a sprinkler system, and there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the insured intended to 
install sprinklers, although the installation had not been made at the 
time of the fire. 
§18.5. Marine insurance: Assailing thieves. Swift v. American 
Universal Insurance CO.1 was an action in contract upon a policy of 
insurance covering a yacht owned by the plaintiff "with respect to 
... Perils ... of the seas ... , fire, lightning, earthquake, assailing 
thieves, theft of the entire Yacht, jettisons, barratry of the Masters and 
Mariners, and of all other like perils, losses and misfortunes, that 
have or shall come to the hurt, detriment or damage of said yacht or 
any part thereof."2 The plaintiff's evidence established that upon his 
return to the yacht tied up over night at a pier in Neponset, he found 
that a plywood patch installed in a window undergoing repair had 
been forced open and demolished, the door of one of the cabins had 
been forced open, and personal property, valued at $3600, was missing. 
The defendant denied the plaintiff's claim under the policy on the 
ground that the loss was not shown to have been caused by "assailing 
thieves" and, therefore, not within the coverage afforded. 
Earlier forms of marine insurance policies covered losses caused by 
"pirates, rovers [and] thieves."3 In 1839, the Supreme Court of Ten-
§18.5. 1349 Mass. 637, 212 N.E.2d 448 (1965). 
2Id. at 638, 212 N.E.2d at 449. 
3 The British Marine Insurance Policy has been in use essentially unchanged by 
Uoyds of London since at least 1613. See 1 Arnould, Marine Insurance and 
Average §10 (10th ed. 1921). This form recites the insured perils as follows: "of 
the seas, men of war, fire, enemies, pirates, rovers, thieves, jettisons, letters of mart 
and countermart, surprisals, takings at sea, arrests, restraints and detainments of 
all kings, princes, and people, of what nation, condition or quality soever, barratry 
of the master and mariners, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes ..•. " 
5
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nessee held that the word "thieves" in the marine insurance policy 
meant persons not connected with the insured vessel who committed 
thefts by force or violence.4 At about the same time, it was held in 
New York that loss by thieves included secret and nonviolent larceny 
committed by persons employed or working on the vessel.5 The New 
York decisions prompted the marine underwriters to amend their 
policies to cover losses caused by "assailing thieves." The term "assail-
ing thieves" has been interpreted to include robbery by force and 
violence.6 
The Supreme Judicial Court in this case pushed the scope of "as-
sailing thieves" beyond robbery, observing that the element of force 
or violence implicit in these words is not limited to violence against 
the person, but also includes force applied to the ship or to the in-
sured goods in the perpetration of the theft. It found that the trial 
judge was warranted in finding that a theft had been committed 
aboard the insured vessel and that the theft was accomplished by the 
use of force to gain entrance to the cabin from which the goods were 
stolen. The wrongdoers could thus be found to be "assailing thieves" 
within the meaning of the policy. 
§18.6. Marine insurance: Misrepresentation of value. In Rose and 
Lucy, Inc. v. Resolute Insurance CO.,l the libelant sought to recover 
for the loss at sea of the Rose and Lucy under a policy of marine hull 
insurance issued by the respondent to insure the vessel at an agreed 
value of $30,000. The respondent denied payment and asserted that 
the policy was void for fraud because the libelant in applying for 
the insurance misrepresented the value of the vessel. In making ap-
plication, the libelant requested $30,000 coverage, but at no time ex-
pressly stated what the value of the vessel was, nor was the libelant 
ever asked what its value was. The respondent's contention is that 
under a custom in the trade an application for insurance on a vessel 
in the amount of $30,000, without any express statement of the vessel's 
fair market value, is understood as a representation that the vessel's 
fair market value is approximately $30,000. 
Little independent evidence was introduced in the case to establish 
the existence of such a custom of the insurance business, and no evi-
dence was introduced to show that the libelant had been informed of 
the custom, or that the custom was so widespread and so commonly 
known as to raise a presumption that persons outside the business 
were aware of it. The custom, if indeed it existed at all, was ineffective 
to convert an innocent statement of the amount of insurance desired 
into an unintended representation as to value which, if it turned out 
4 Marshall v. Nashville Marine &: Fire Insurance Co., 20 Tenn. 99 (1839). 
5Atlantic Insurance Co. v. Storrow, 5 Paige 285 (N.Y. Ch. 1835); American In-
surance Co. v. Bryan, 26 Wend. 563 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1841). 
6 Feinberg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 161 F. Supp. 686 (D. Mass. 1958), 
rev'd on other grounds, 260 F.2d 523 (1st Cir. 1958). 
§18.6. l249 F. Supp. 991 (D. Mass. 1965). 
6
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to be incorrect, voided the policy and deprived the libelant of the 
insurance protection. 
Moreover, the policy cannot be voided for misrepresentation where 
the alleged misrepresentation was not relied upon. In accordance with 
a well-established practice, the respondent's representative had ob-
tained a marine survey of the vessel and obtained the surveyor's esti-
mated value of $40,000. The respondent cannot thereafter argue that 
he relied on the insured's statement and was mislead by it. 
§18.7. Property insurance: Representations and warranties. 
Charles, Henry & Crowley Co. v. The Home Insurance Co.! raised the 
question as to whether a representation or warranty made in the ap-
plication for a policy of insurance, in this case a Jewelers' Block Policy, 
may be converted into a condition precedent to recovery under the 
policy. In the proposal form submitted to the defendant, the plaintiff 
insured stated in response to Question 14B that, during business hours, 
the value of jewelry displayed in a protected window or showcase 
would not exceed $14,500 and the value of jewelry displayed in an 
unprotected window or showcase would not exceed $500. The policy 
issued by the defendant following receipt of the insured's proposal 
carried a Jewelers' Block Combination Endorsement, which recited 
among other provisions that "It is a condition of this insurance prece-
dent to any recovery hereunder that the values of property displayed 
will not exceed the amount represented in answer to Question 14B 
of the proposal form attached to this policy."2 While this policy was 
in force the display windows were smashed and more than $13,000 of 
jewelry was stolen at a time when jewelry worth more than $18,000 
was displayed in the protected area and more than $1,000 was dis-
played in the unprotected area. The defendant denied coverage. 
The trial judge treated the policy provision as a representation or 
warranty coming within the provisions of General Laws, Chapter 175, 
Section 186,3 and found for the insured on the ground that the in-
surer's risk had not been materially increased by the display of the 
more valuable jewelry and that the parties had stipulated that there 
was no intent to deceive the insurer. The Supreme Judicial Court 
reversed this finding, observing that Section 186 applies to representa-
tions and warranties and does not apply to conditions precedent ex-
pressly included in the insurance policy.4 The statement made by the 
§18.7. 1349 Mass. 723, 212 N.E.2d 240 (1965). 
2Id. at 724, 212 N.E.2d at 241. 
3 G.L., c. 175, §186, provides: "No oral or written misrepresentation or warranty 
made in the negotiation of a policy of insurance by the insured or in his behalf 
shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid the policy or prevent its attaching 
unless such misrepresentation or warranty is made with actual intent to deceive, 
or unless the matter misrepresented or made a warranty increased the risk of 
loss." 
4 Sullivan v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 342 Mass. 649, 174 N.E.2d 
771 (1961); Giannelli v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 307 Mass. 18, 29 N.E.2d 
124 (1940); Barker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 188 Mass. 542, 74 N.E. 945 
(1905). 
7
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insured in the proposal, in the view of the Court, was a representation 
concerning future events, but was converted by express provision into 
a condition precedent which, if not complied with, would bar recovery. 
That the legal significance of statements made in the application for 
insurance can be changed was settled by the Kravit and Faris cases.5 
What may at first be a representation or warranty in the insurance 
application may become a condition of the policy if (I) the statement 
made by the insured relates essentially to the insurer's intelligent de-
cision to issue the policy; and (2) the statement is made a condition 
precedent to recovery under the policy, either by using the precise 
words "condition precedent" or their equivalent. The representations 
in the Kravit and Faris cases related to existing facts, but it has been 
held that representations concerning future events may be conditions 
precedent where the policies so provide.6 In this case, it was apparent 
that the value of the displayed jewelry was an essential element in the 
evaluation of the risk to be assumed by the insurer and in clear lan-
guage the parties agreed to treat the representations as a condition 
precedent to recovery. In these circumstances, the insurer was not re-
quired to show either an intent to deceive or an increase of risk in 
order to avoid the policy. 
§18.8. Policy conditions: Assistance and cooperation. Allen v. 
Atlantic National Insurance CO.I was a bill in equity to reach and 
apply the proceeds of a liability policy in satisfaction of a judgment 
obtained by the plaintiff in an action at law for personal injuries 
sustained on the premises of one Mrs. Fisch in an accident which 
occurred while Mrs. Fisch was in Florida. The premises were covered 
under the liability policy issued by the defendant insurer to Mrs. 
Fisch. An attorney for the insurer defended Mrs. Fisch throughout 
the trial of the action at law before the auditor and before the jury. 
On May 10, 1964, and again on May 12 the attorney attempted to 
telephone Mrs. Fisch, a woman 77 years old who "speaks less than 
perfect English," in Florida to request her appearance at the jury trial 
commencing on May 13. Subsequently, a telegram reading "Contact 
... [the attorney's] office immediately concerning accident of May 14, 
1959 at ... [premises address] otherwise you will be personally re-
sponsible"2 was sent to her, arriving at her place of residence at 11 P.M. 
on the evening before the trial which prompted a telephone call by 
her son to the attorney. There was no indication that her appearance 
at the trial was necessary or that she could have contributed anything 
to the defense of the action. Following judgment for the plaintiff, the 
/I Kravit v. United States Casualty Co., 278 Mass. 178, 179 N.E. 1I99 (19112), and 
Faris v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 278 Mass. 204, 179 N.E. 605 (19112). The ques-
tion was discussed but not decided in Everson v. General Accident, Fire &: Life 
Assurance Corp., 202 Mass. 169, 88 N.E. 658 (1909). 
8 Krause v. Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa, 1I1111 Mass. 200, 129 N.E.2d 
617 (1955); Elder v. Federal Insurance Co., 2111 Mass. 1I89, 100 N.E. 655 (19111). 
§18.8. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 151, 214 N.E.2d 28. 
2Id. at 152, 214 N.E.2d at 29. 
8
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insurer disclaimed liability on the ground of a material breach of the 
assistance and cooperation clause. 
The obligations under the assistance and cooperation clause are 
reciprocal obligations imposed upon the insured and the insurance 
company.3 The insured must cooperate as a condition of the insurer's 
obligation to perform under the policy of insurance, but the insurer 
is under a duty to exercise diligence and good faith in seeking coopera-
tion of the insured. On the evidence of delayed communication, the 
failure of the telegram to indicate a trial date or to request the de-
fendant's presence and the telephone call of the defendant's son, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that an adequate response had been made 
to the notification received and that there had been no failure of co-
operation on the part of the insured. 
Even if sufficient grounds for disclaimer were found, the insurer 
was required to enter a reservation of rights before trial.4 The cryptic 
statement of personal responsibility in the attorney's telegram to the 
defendant was hardly a sufficient reservation of rights. A disclaimer 
made after the verdict was rendered was wholly ineffective. Ii 
§18.9. Policy conditions: Action against company. In Jenkins v. 
General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp.,1 the insured as a 
third-party plaintiff moved to implead under General Laws, Chapter 
231, Section 4B,2 the insurer as defendant in an action in which the 
insured was being sued for damages arising out of personal injuries 
sustained by a guest in the insured's automobile. The defendant had 
issued to him a policy under which it agreed to pay "all sums which 
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because 
of bodily injury, ... sustained by any person, caused by accident and 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the motor 
vehicle."3 The insurer entered a demurrer and an answer in abatement 
to the insured's declaration which were sustained in the Superior 
Court. 
On appeal, the insured contended that the statute permits the im-
pleading of an insurer. The insurer argued that the statute did not 
apply to insurers because impleading prejudices the insurer, and fur-
ther, that impleading the insurer before the insured's obligation to 
pay has been finally determined is contrary to the provisions of the 
3 Imperiali v. Pica, 338 Mass. 494, 156 N.E.2d 44 (1959), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §16.6. 
4 Polito v. Galluzzo, 337 Mass. 360, 149 N.E.2d 375 (1958), noted in 1958 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §18.8; Salonen v. Paanenen, 320 Mass. 568, 7I N.E.2d 227 (1947); 
Goldberg v. Preferred Accident Insurance Co., 279 Mass. 393, 181 N.E. 235 (1932). 
I) Rose v. Regan, 344 Mass. 223, 181 N.E.2d 796 (1962), noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §16.8. 
§18.9. 1349 Mass. 699, 212 N.E.2d 464 (1965). 
2 G.L., c. 231, §4B, approved July 3, 1964, provides in pertinent part as follows: 
"a defendant ... may, as a third-party plaintiff, enter a writ and have served a 
summons and third·party declaration upon a person not a party to the action 
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." 
8349 Mass. 699, 700, 212 N.E.2d 464, 466 (1965). 
9
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Action Against Company condition of the policy, which states that 
"[n]o action shall lie against the corporation unless ... the amount 
of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been finally determined 
... [n]or shall the corporation be impleaded by the insured or his legal 
representative."4 
The Supreme Judicial Court disposed of the first of these arguments 
by observing that if the advantages inherent in avoiding a multiplicity 
of suits is outweighed by the prejudicial effect upon the insurer, the 
judge may sever the cases. It disposed of the second argument by hold-
ing that the insurer cannot by a contract with its insured limit a court's 
right to determine whether the insurer is liable for a claim against 
the insured until there has been a final judgment on the claim. Neither 
can the parties to the insurance policy prevent prosecution of the 
cause of action by agreeing that the insurer may not be impleaded. To 
hold otherwise would, in the opinion of the Court, nullify the plain 
intent of the Legislature in enacting the impleader statute, namely to 
avoid a multiplicity of actions. 
In response to this holding, the standard provisions Action Against 
Company condition of the Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Liability 
Policy has been amended to eliminate the provision limiting the right 
of the insured to implead the insurer. 
§18.10. Hospital service corporation: Hospital reimbursement 
agreement. In common with other forms of insurance generally, 
spiralling costs for the services and items of indemnity provided by 
hospital insprance contracts are continuing to exert upward pressures 
on the premium rates for such contracts. The rate of reimbursement 
for services rendered by participating hospitals directly and im-
mediately influences the charges to subscribers for hospital service 
contracts issued by Massachusetts Hospital Service, Inc. (Blue Cross). 
These inescapable premium increases are very troublesome to ap-
proval authorities hesitant to permit any increases in the cost to the 
general public of insurance protection. 
In Massachusetts Hospital Service, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ad-
ministration,l Blue Cross and a group of participating hospitals sought 
a declaratory judgment upholding the validity of a hospital reimburse-
ment agreement approved in December of 1964 by a former Commis-
sioner of Administration. In March of 1965, the new commissioner 
notified Blue Cross that the agreement theretofore approved did not 
comply with the statutory requirements2 because the rate of reimburse-
4 Id. at 701, 212 N.E.2d at 466. 
§18.1O. 1 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1123, 218 N.E.2d 383. 
2 G.L., c. 176A, §5, provides in part: "All rates of payments to hospitals made 
by such corporations under such contracts shall be approved in advance by the 
commissioner of administration, in this section called the commissioner. No rates 
of payment shall be approved by the commissioner unless such rates reflect reason-
able hospital costs or are based on charges made to the general public. whichever 
is the lower. The commissioner in determining reasonable cost may give considera-
tion to depreciation, amortization and individual services which are rendered for 
10
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ment was based in part upon a merger of out-patient costs and charges 
with the cost and charges for in-patient special services, and in part 
upon the net cost of care of the medically indigent. Historically, the 
rate of reimbursement was separately determined for out-patient ser-
vices and for in-patient special services, and charges uncollected from 
the medically indigent had not been included as an element of cost in 
determining rates of payment to the hospitals. 
In the past, in addition to separate reimbursement determinations 
for special services to in-patients and out-patients, the hospital reim-
bursement agreements also provided for separate determinations of 
the amounts to be reimbursed for special services rendered to Blue 
Cross members with indemnity coverage (i.e., pays charges up to 
specific dollar amount) and those with comprehensive coverage (i.e., 
pays full charges for ward or semi-private room). For comprehensive 
members, rates of reimbursement for special services were calculated 
with the rates for room and board and routine nursing care; for in-
demnity members the reimbursement rates for special services were 
separately calculated. The new contract provided a single payment 
procedure for special services rendered by a participating hospital 
without regard to whether the special service was rendered to an in-
patient or out-patient and whether the patient has indemnity or com-
prehensive coverage. The new contract also produced increased pay-
ments to the participating hospitals for services rendered. 
The Commissioner contended that the words "reasonable hospital 
costs" as used in the statute meant "the cost to the hospital . . . [of] 
performing the services for which reimbursement is to be made" and 
would thus invalidate the inclusion of costs for any category of special 
services for which reimbursement is not provided under the member's 
subscription agreement. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this 
view, observing that the statutory language suggests that the hospital 
costs which Blue Cross rates of reimbursement must reflect may in-
clude those necessary costs of any legitimate and reasonable services 
which hospitals have traditionally furnished. All of the various costs 
which a hospital incurs must somehow be recovered if it is to continue 
to render hospital service. To whatever extent Blue Cross is precluded 
from paying a proportionate share of any of such necessary costs, 
patients not members of Blue Cross3 must shoulder the burden of 
higher hospital rates either directly or by passing them on to insurers 
other than Blue Cross. 
For some hospital services, charges exceed costs, for others costs 
partial or no payment. The commissioner shall approve or disapprove rates under 
this section within a reasonable period of time. A hospital or non·profit hospital 
service corporation shall file with the commissioner on request such data, statistics, 
schedules or information as he may reasonably require to enable him to approve 
or disapprove contracts with or rates of payments to hospitals." 
3 Over 50 per cent of the residents of Massachusetts are Blue Cross members and 
they account for about 50 per cent of the patient days in Massachusetts hospitals. 
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exceed charges. To allocate costs between the various special hospital 
services and between types of patients with precision is very difficult 
and very expensive. The agreed-upon formulae for determining rates 
of reimbursement recognize the need to include the basic expenses of 
operating a hospital and there is nothing in the statute which inhibits 
the use of such formulae. Moreover, the selected formulae are not 
invalidated because they produce higher rates of reimbursement for 
the participating hospitals. 
The inclusion of costs for the care of the medically indigent to 
which the Commissioner of Administration objected is limited to the 
rates of reimbursement for in-patient care of comprehensive members 
of Blue Cross. These costs are not included in the formulae for out-
patient treatment or for in-patient care of indemnity members. The 
latter, of course, bear a share of the burden of these costs, to the extent 
that they are required to pay to the hospitals the difference between 
the indemnity benefit and the hospital charges, which charges neces-
sarily include a premium for the care of the medically indigent. The 
Court dismissed the Commissioner's argument that the comprehensive 
members received no benefit from the costs incurred in treating those 
unable to pay for such treatment and consequently such costs were 
improperly included in the reimbursement formulae. Such costs are 
"reasonable hospital costs" within the statutory meaning and there is 
nothing unreasonable in requiring Blue Cross comprehensive members 
to provide some part of such costs, which would otherwise be borne 
wholly by those non-members and indemnity members unfortunate 
enough to be hospitalized. 
B. GENERAL INSURANCE-LEGISLATION 
§18.11. Motor vehicle insurance. More than ordinary attention 
was given during the 1966 SURVEY year to the related problems of the 
administration of the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance 
Law,l the promotion of highway safety and the cost of motor vehicle 
liability insurance. Over the years, since the Compulsory Insurance 
Law was enacted in 1927, it and the related insurance and motor 
vehicle laws have been the subject of repeated studies and investiga-
tions.2 Generally these studies have been prompted by complaints con-
cerning the high cost of motor vehicle insurance. Some of those con-
cerned with this problem apparently continue to believe that changes 
in the character or administration of existing law will somehow bring 
about a reduction in such insurance costs. 
During 1966 the Governor delivered two special messages to the 
Legislature on these subjects. The first of these, delivered in February,S 
§18.11. 1 G.L., c. 90, §§34A-34J. 
2 The most recent of these was accomplished by a special legislative commission 
appointed in 1956, which made a detailed investigation of these problems and 
filed a lengthy report for consideration by the 1959 session of the General Court. 
See 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.8. 
S House No. 3131 (1966). 
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concerned itself with the elimination of the causes of highway acci-
dents. In this message, the Governor recommended legislation (a) to 
require reports of all accidents, completed under the penalties of 
perjury, to be filed with the Registry of Motor Vehicles, (b) to provide 
financial assistance to the cities and towns for driver education courses, 
(c) to require eye re-examination for licensed drivers, (d) to make 
breath tests compulsory for drivers arrested for driving under the 
influence, (e) to prohibit school bus standees, (f) to make anti-jay walk-
ing laws compulsory, (g) to require directional signal lights on all 
motor vehicles and their periodic inspection, (h) to permit inspection 
of all school buses by the Registry, and (i) to make state engineers and 
state funds available for the correction of high-accident locations on 
roads other than state roads. The Governor closed his message by 
suggesting that a reduction in insurance premiums requires a reduction 
in accident frequency and that an accident frequency reduction re-
quires increased highway safety efforts. 
In May, the Governor delivered a second message4 specifically di-
rected to the problem of high compulsory insurance costs. The pro-
posed solution to this problem would (1) achieve greater highway 
safety, (2) improve the procedure by which personal injury claims are 
processed, (3) repeal the compulsory insurance law, and (4) substitute 
a financial responsibility law supplemented by an unsatisfied claim 
and judgment fund law. For the first of these objectives the Legislature 
was referred to the earlier legislative recommendations of the Gover-
nor. Significantly, in the May message Massachusetts is compared with 
New Jersey because of the physical similarities between the two states 
and, presumably, because New Jersey now has the type of laws pro-
posed as a substitute for the compulsory law. This comparison em-
phasizes the essential reason for the high insurance costs in this state, 
which is summed up in the statement: "Massachusetts, therefore, has 
over two and one half times as many personal injury accidents per one 
thousand insured cars per year as does New Jersey." This disparity 
can be corrected by more vigorous programs of traffic law enforcement, 
driver training and safety education, but not by a change in the 
statute requiring motorists to be financially responsible for the in-
juries caused by their operation of motor vehicles. 
The suggestion that modifications in insurance claims-handling 
practices may contribute to a reduction in insurance costs seems to 
be based upon a conception that such modifications would somehow 
eliminate the public "claims consciousness" thought to exist in this 
state. It was recommended that a special commission be created to 
study the feasibility and desirability of bringing about fundamental 
changes in claims procedures, with particular attention to the Keeton-
O'Connell Plan5 and similar plans. This plan, of course, goes far be-
4 House No. 3629 (1966). 
5 Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim (Little, Brown 
& Co., 1965). 
13
Burgoyne and Donovan: Chapter 18: Insurance
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1966
264 1966 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §18.l1 
yond claims-handling practices and envisions complex and sweeping 
changes in the laws concerning negligence, accident liability and in-
surance protection. Parenthetically, it also envisions a compulsory 
insurance system. 
The notion that repeal of the compulsory insurance law and the 
enactment of a financial responsibility law and an unsatisfied claim 
and judgment fund law will bring about a reduction in insurance 
costs assumes either that (a) the New Jersey-type laws will bring to 
Massachusetts New Jersey-type experience,6 or (b) that under the re-
vised insurance system fewer claims will be paid or fewer dollars will 
be paid on each claim. Neither of these assumptions is particularly 
tenable. The number of injuries resulting in claims for damages de-
pends upon the number of accidents, not upon how the fund is created 
to pay for them. That it is not intended that fewer claims will be paid 
is clear from the proposal that the financial responsibility law,7 which 
requires insurance protection only after the occurrence of an accident 
or a moving traffic violation, be supplemented by an unsatisfied claim 
and judgment fund lawS to provide a source of recovery for unsatisfied 
judgments against motorists liable for injuries resulting from auto-
mobile accidents. The total insurance system would be relieved only 
of those judgments against uninsured motorists which are satisfied out 
of the personal funds of such motorists. The insurance funds and the 
unsatisfied judgment fund would together be called upon to pay es-
sentially all other losses. The compulsory feature would remain, since 
every motor vehicle owner would be compelled to either insure or pay 
an uninsured motorist's fee into the fund. But the person who elected 
to insure would be required to help pay the losses caused by the un-
insured as the statutory assessments on insurance companies to help 
support the fund and the expense incurred by the companies in in-
vestigating and defending claims against the fund become a part of 
the cost of his insurance. 
Despite several legislative efforts to rescue this proposal, it finally 
rested at prorogation in the Special Study Commission on Compulsory 
6 The Governor's message at page 10 states: "The Commonwealth has had a 
compulsory automobile insurance system for the past forty years. There is ample 
evidence that such a law leads to a high degree of claims-consciousness resulting 
in extremely high claims frequencies. Massachusetts, in fact, has the highest bodily 
injury claims frequency in the United States with approximately eight bodily 
injury claims per one hundred insured passenger cars. New Jersey has approxi-
mately 2.8, and the national average bodily injury claim frequency is approximately 
2.7 per one hundred insured vehicles." 
7 Some form of financial responsibility law is currently in effect in 47 states. 
Compulsory insurance laws were enacted in New York in 1957 and in North Caro-
lina in 1958. 
S Three states have enacted unsatisfied claim and judgment fund laws: Maryland 
(1957), New Jersey (1952), and Michigan (1965). Both the Maryland and New Jersey 
funds are in serious financial difficulties despite increases in uninsured motorists 
fees, assessments on insurance companies, or both. 
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Motor Vehicle Insurance9 to which had been referred virtually all of 
the 1966 bills on this and related subjects. The study committee has 
filed its report, which once again advocates stiffer laws aimed at re-
ducing the number of accidents and thus reducing compulsory auto-
mobile insurance rates. 
§18.12. Motor vehicle insurance: Uninsured motorists coverage. 
In the 1959 legislative session the General Court, following the recom-
mendation of the special commission to investigate and study the 
motor vehicle laws and the insurance laws as they relate to motor 
vehicles, authorized the companies to write "uninsured motorists" 
coverage on Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Liability Policies.! Acts of 
1966, Chapter 260,2 makes the inclusion of this coverage mandatory 
in all Massachusetts Motor Vehicle Liability Policies, subject, how-
ever, to the right of the insured to reject the coverage. The rejection 
of this coverage must be in writing and, once rejected, the coverage 
is not required in any renewal policy unless it is specifically requested 
in writing by the named insured. 
While this coverage has been widely written in this state and a 
substantial proportion of the automobile owners in the state now 
carry the coverage, the insurance companies have not been required 
to write it or to exert any special efforts to promote the sale of the 
coverage. Experience elsewhere has demonstrated that the "mandatory 
with right of rejection" uninsured motorists coverage statute has the 
effect of making the coverage a part of virtually all policies since only 
an extremely small number of insureds refuse to accept and pay for it. 
In these circumstances, the gaps in the insurance protection afforded 
under the present compulsory insurance system to which the Governor 
referred in his May 13 special message,S e.g., the uninsured driver, the 
hit-and-run driver, the newly arrived uninsured former resident of 
another state, the "insurance dodger" who permits his insurance to 
lapse after obtaining registration, and the like will, for all practical 
purposes, be closed. This enactment would seem to eliminate effec-
tively the need for an unsatisfied claim and judgment fund as proposed 
in the Governor's message. 
§18.13. Motor vehicle insurance: Cancellation. Section 34K of 
General Laws, Chapter 90,1 prescribes the manner in which a premium 
financing agency may, under a power of attorney given to it by the 
9 Established by House No. 4248 (1965) (adopted in the House on September 20, 
1965, and in the Senate on September 29, 1965), and continued by Senate No. 660 
(1966) (adopted in the Senate on February 7, 1966, and in the House on February 
11, 1966). 
§18.12. 1 Acts of 1959, c. 438, adding §l11D to G.L., c. 175. See discussion in 
1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.8. 
2 Adding new §34L to G.L., c. 90, effective August 8, 1966. 
S House No. 3629 (1966), discussed in §18.11 supra. 
§18.l3. 1 Newly added by Acts of 1960, c. 360, discussed in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §16.1O. 
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borrower, effect cancellation of a compulsory motor vehicle liability 
policy for non-payment of the financed premium. Acts of 1966, Chap-
ter 133,2 which became effective July 5, 1966, provides for reinstate-
ment of the coverage afforded by such a policy upon the payment of 
the full amount due by giving to the insurer notice that it is revoking 
its notice of cancellation. To be effective and binding upon the in-
surer the notice of revocation must be received by the insurer not 
less than three days prior to the effective date specified in the notice 
of cancellation. 
§18.14. Combination policies: Boiler and machinery insurance. 
Acts of 1966, Chapter 80,1 broadens the authority of two or more 
companies to issue a single fire insurance policy to permit the in-
clusion in such a policy of insurance against the hazards specified in 
the fifth clause of General Laws, Chapter 175, Section 47, commonly 
referred to as boiler and machinery coverage. 
§18.15. Disability insurance: Optometric services. Acts of 1966, 
Chapter 386,1 requires, whenever a policy of insurance provides re-
imbursement for any visual services, that such reimbursement be made 
to either the registered optometrist or the registered physician of the 
insured's selection. Visual services are defined as optometric services 
by registered optometrists and physicians as set out in the statute 
prescribing the registration of the professions.2 
§18.l6. Agents and brokers: Return premiums. Acts of 1966, 
Chapter 423,1 adds to the insurance law a new section which requires 
premium finance agencies, insurance agents and brokers, within thirty 
days of receipt thereof, to pay over or credit the full amount of the 
return premium resulting from cancellation of a motor vehicle policy 
to the insured or his assignee and to give immediate notice to the in-
sured when payment is made to the assignee. Failure to do so, in the 
case of an insurance agent or broker, is cause for suspension or revoca-
tion by the Commissioner of Insurance of the licenses issued to the 
agent or broker. In the case of premium finance agencies, a failure to 
comply with the new law will, upon information from the Commis-
sioner of Insurance or any other source, be cause for suspension or 
revocation by the Commissioner of Banks of the license issued to such 
agency. 
§18.17. Insurance companies: Safety inspections. Acts of 1966, 
c. 252,1 provides that furnishing or failing to furnish safety inspections 
or advisory services designed to reduce the likelihood of injury, death, 
2 Amending G.L., c. 255C, §21. 
§18.14. 1 Amending G.L., c. 175, §102A. 
§18.I5. 1 Adding paragraph D to G.L., c. 175, §108, subdiv. 8; subdiv. (f) to 
G.L., c. 175, §110, and §3A to G.L., c. 15lD. 
2 G.L., c. 112, §66. 
§18.I6. 1 Adding to G.L., c. 175, a new §176A, and amending G.L., c. 255C, §5. 
§18.17. 1 Adding new §16A to G.L., c. 143. 
16
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1966 [1966], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1966/iss1/21
§18.19 INSURANCE 267 
or loss shall not subject the insurer or its representative to liability 
for damages for injury, death, or loss resulting from any act or omis-
sion in the course of such activities, provided the condition which 
was the proximate cause of injury, death, or loss was not created by 
the active negligence of the insurer or its representative_ 
C. LIFE INSURANCE - COURT DECISIONS 
§18.18. Application for policy: Duty of company and agent. In 
Rogers v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of America} decided dur-
ing the 1966 SURVEY year, the plaintiff sought to recover in tort from 
an insurer and its agent for their claimed negligence in failing sea-
sonably to process an application for life insurance. She alleged that 
her husband had made the application for a policy on his own life, 
in which the plaintiff was to be named beneficiary, and had paid the 
first premium, but died before being either issued the policy or noti-
fied of rejection. The Superior Court sustained the defendants' de-
murrers and was affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Judicial Court had 
held in Rapp v. Lester L. Burdick, Inc.2 that it could not accept the 
view that unreasonable delay in acting on an application for insurance 
gives rise to a right in tort against either the soliciting agent or the 
insurance company. The Court in that case distinguished cases which 
present special circumstances of assertion, representation, and reliance, 
and concluded3 that in the ordinary case where no present "binder" 
is purchased, making application for a policy establishes no relation-
ship on which a duty from the solicitor to the applicant can be predi-
cated. Since the Rogers case presented no special circumstances, the 
applicant and the company stood in the usual relation of offeror and 
offeree4 and any delay in acting on the application was not actionable. 
§18.19. Fraternal benefit societies: Exclusion of members; filing 
by-law amendments. Armstrong v. Peabody Police Relief Association, 
Inc.1 was a bill for declaration of the status of the plaintiffs as mem-
bers of the defendant association. They all had been reserve police 
officers in Peabody and while so employed had joined the defendant 
association. Thereafter they resigned from the police department, 
never having become regular officers. Still later the association by 
amendment to its membership by-law provided that if a reserve officer 
ceased to be a member of the police department before becoming a 
regular member of the department, he automatically ceased to be a 
member of the association. The Supreme Judicial Court held that, 
although the amendment might be valid in its prospective operation, 
§18.18. 1349 Mass. 774, 212 N.E.2d 231 (1965). 
2336 Mass. 438, 441-442, 146 N.E.2d 368, 370-371 (1957), noted in 1958 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §18.1. 
SId. at 443, 146 N.E.2d at 371. 
4 Gabbett v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 303 Mass. 433, 435, 21 N.E.2d 
950, 951 (1939). 
§18.19. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 847, 217 N.E.2d 747. 
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it could not be applied retroactively so as to defeat the rights of the 
plaintiffs. An association such as the defendant, it said, may reduce 
the benefits available for all members and may redefine, for all mem-
bers, the conditions of recovery. But to exclude a small group of 
members in good standing from participating in its benefits would be 
to act unreasonably, arbitrarily, and in violation of the contract be-
tween it and those members. In reaching its decision, the Court held 
that the amendment was not invalidated by reason of the association's 
failure to comply with the provision of the statute governing its 
affairs2 which required it to file amendments to its by-laws with the 
Commissioner of Insurance within thirty days after their adoption. 
That statute, said the Court, did not require filing for the purpose of 
obtaining the Commisioner's approval without which the amendment 
could not take effect. The new Section 10 of General Laws, Chapter 
176 (which, however, is not applicable here) requires such approval 
by the Commissioner before an amendment can take effect. It would 
have been easy for the Legislature to use similar language, had it 
wished, in the former Section 45, which governs this case. Since such 
language was not used, the Court concluded that the filing require-
ment was simply to give notice to the Commissioner, and through him 
to the public, of the by-law change. The filing of the amendment here 
was late and delayed the notice, but did not render the amendment 
ineffective. 
§18.20. Assumption of corporate name: Protest. The Supreme 
Judicial Court during the 1966 SURVEY year clarified the procedure 
with respect to adoption and protest of corporate names of insurance 
companies. General Laws, Chapter 155, Section 9, provides that a 
corporate name may not be assumed which is so similar to the name 
of an existing person, firm, or corporation doing business in the 
Commonwealth as to be likely to be mistaken for it. Equity jurisdiction 
is granted in the statute to enjoin a corporation from doing business 
under a name assumed in violation of that section even though its 
articles of organization or amendment may have been approved and a 
certificate of incorporation may have been issued to it. That statute 
also provides for a hearing by the State Secretary on any protest filed 
by an existing corporation that the newly assumed name of another 
corporation is so similar to the protestor's name or trade name as to 
be likely to be mistaken for it. l "If after the hearing the secretary shall 
be of the opinion that the assuming of the name violates any provision 
2 G.L., c. 176, §45, as appearing immediately before the enactment of Chapter 
540 of the Acts of 1958. See id. §2. 
§18.20. 1 "If within thirty days of the date when the certificate or articles of 
organization of any corporation are filed in the office of the state secretary any 
other corporation ..• shall protest in writing to the secretary that the name as-
sumed ... is the same as the name or trade name of the protesting corporation ... 
or so similar thereto as to be likely to be mistaken for it, the secretary shall . . . 
hear the party protesting and the corporation which assumed the name .... " G.L., 
c. 155, §9. 
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of this section, he shall record a statement withdrawing his approval 
of said certificate or articles in so far as it or they relate to the name 
assumed by the corporation .... " General Laws, Chapter 175, Section 
49, provides that insurance companies shall be subject to the afore-
mentioned Chapter 155, Section 9 "except as otherwise expressly 
provided in this chapter." It then states that "[t]he name of the cor-
poration shall be subject to approval by the [c ]ommissioner" of 
Insurance. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Massachu-
setts Life Insurance CO.2 the Supreme Judicial Court held that the net 
effect of these statutes is to require, in the case of names of insurance 
companies, the written approval of the Insurance Commissioner prior 
to, and as well as, the approval of the State Secretary.3 But only the 
State Secretary has the power to hold a hearing and withdraw approval. 
Therefore a hearing volunteered by the Insurance Commissioner, after 
the State Secretary had refused to entertain the plaintiff's protest of 
the name assumed by the defendant bcause he believed he had no 
jurisdiction, was a nullity and his decision thereon was void.4 The 
plaintiff was held to be entitled to challenge the defendant's assump-
tion of the name in a de novo proceeding in the Superior Court in 
accordance with General Laws, Chapter 155, Section 9, and to seek as 
well statutory5 and common law relief against unfair competition.6 
D. LIFE INSURANCE-LEGISLATION 
§18.21. Variable annuities: Assets; approval of forms. Acts of 
1966, Chapter 84, amended General Laws, Chapter 175, Section 48B, 
so as to provide expressly that assets of variable annuity insurance 
companies! which are set aside for variable annuity contracts shall not 
be chargeable with liabilities arising out of any other business the 
company may conduct, but shall be held and applied exclusively for 
the benefit of variable annuity contracts. 
The Commissioner of Insurance has been empowered by Acts of 
1966, Chapter 604, which amends Section 134B of Chapter 175 of the 
General Laws, to establish from time to time rules and regulations 
setting forth standards to be followed in his approval of forms of 
variable annuity contracts, and applications and group certificates 
relating thereto. Such standards may relate among other things to 
termination of contract, withdrawal of funds by the contract holder, 
factors used in determining initial payments, and valuation of assets 
and liabilities. The statute also gives the Commissioner authority to 
establish from time to time rules and regulations with respect to the 
21966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1161, 218 N.E.2d 564. See also §8.6 supra. 
3Id. at 1166, 218 N.E.2d at 568. 
4Id. at 1167, 218 N.E.2d at 569. 
5 G.L., c. 110, §7A. 
61966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1161, 1168-1169, 218 N.E.2d 564, 569·570. 
§18.21. ! See 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.19. 
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accounting of funds allocated to payments under fixed income options, 
the balance between fixed and variable income, and limitation of 
expenses. 
§18.22. Stock companies: Formation; merger; disclosure of condi-
tion. Acts of 1966, Chapter 95, makes applicable to the merger of 
stock insurance companies the same requirements as to amount of 
paid-up capital as are applicable to the formation of new stock com-
panies.1 It also adds to Section 48 of Chapter 175 of the General Laws 
certain safeguards concerning investment in new stock companies by 
insiders.2 New companies are to have only one class of stock, with a par 
value at time of original issue of at least $50 per share. The promoters,3 
organizers, directors and officers are required to buy at least 25 per cent 
of the first million dollars of stock originally issued and at least 15 per 
cent of each additional million dollars of original issue at the same 
price and terms as stock offered publicly, and to hold the stock so 
purchased for at least five years unless the Insurance Commissioner 
approves a prior transfer. Only non-tradable options and warrants may 
be issued. None of these may be issued to promoters except at the time 
of original issue, and then only if (a) the total number of shares covered 
by all options and warrants does not exceed 10 per cent of the total 
number of shares originally issued; (b) the price of purchase on the 
exercise of options and warrants is not less than the price at which any 
stock was offered for sale to the public at the time the options or 
warrants were granted, and in no event less than the fair market value 
of the stock at that time; and (c) the options and warrants are not 
transferable except by operation of law as a result of death or with the 
prior written approval of the Commissioner, and are not exercisable 
more than five years after issuance. Issuance of any options or warrants 
in payment of promotional expenses must be justified to the Com-
missioner by a showing of the nature of the services or other con-
siderations for which they are issued. The aggregate of all organiza-
tional and promotional expenses is not to exceed 10 per cent of the 
amount actually paid on the company's capital stock. Options and 
warrants may be issued to insurance agents only in accordance with 
rules prescribed by the Commissioner. The new statute also requires 
the Commissioner, before approving the articles of organization of a 
new company, to satisfy himself that it has a reasonable prospect for 
success and that various specified projections and assumptions basic to 
its business are sound and reasonable.4 
Acts of 1966, Chapter 98, exempts any insurance companies having 
less than 100 stockholders, or having at least 95 per cent of its stock 
owned or controlled by another insurer and the remaining shares held 
by less than 500 stockholders, from the provisions of General Laws, 
§18.22. 1 Acts of 1966, c. 95, §I. 
2Id. §2. 
8 Defined as "any person who ... directly or indirectly takes initiative in found-
ing and organizing" such a company. Id. §2. 
4Id. §3. 
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Chapter 175, Section 193J. That section requires domestic insurers 
whose securities are not listed on a national exchange to file with the 
Commissioner of Insurance and to furnish to stockholders informa-
tion prescribed by regulation concerning the condition of the 
company.5 
§18.23. Fraternal benefit societies: Investments. Acts of 1966, 
Chapter 229, adds to General Laws, Chapter 176, Section 40, a provi-
sion allowing any fraternal benefit society to invest in the nonassessable 
(unless for taxes) stock or certificates of American corporations or 
business trusts. Such investment is subject to the familiar limitations 
whereby no more than 10 per cent of the society's funds may be 
invested in the stock or shares of anyone corporation or trust, and no 
society may invest in more than 10 per cent of the stock or certificates 
of anyone corporation or trust. 
§18.24. Life companies: Investments. General Laws, Chapter 175, 
Section 66, heretofore forbade any domestic life company (1) to invest 
in its own stock, (2) to invest in the stock of any other insurance 
company,1 (3) to invest in more than 10 per cent of the stock of any 
one corporation,2 or (4) to invest more than 10 per cent of its own 
capital and surplus in the stock of anyone corporation. Acts of 1966, 
Chapter 451, amended Section 66 so as to remove the prohibition 
against investment by a domestic life company in its own stock, and to 
allow such a company to invest, without either of the 10 per cent 
limitations, in a life company which does not have any of its funds 
invested directly or indirectly in the stock of any other insurance 
company. 
5 See 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.9. 
§18.24. 1 Except a variable annuity company. See 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§17.19. 
2 Ibid. 
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